This is a lengthy but relentlessly fascinating story about the Boeing software (MCAS) whose recent malfunction killed hundreds of people. Not just worth a read, but probably worth multiple re-reads, too. I'll be thinking about this for a long time.
Some of the design failures were engineering oversights (not doing harmonics analysis on a bridge), some the engineers protested loudly due to the dangerous designs (NASA), and some the design was sound but construction company didn't build it to the design (sky bridge at a mall).
I don't think it's in an ethical engineers interest to just stay silent or blame up mgmt chain, they're in the best position to identify all 3 of these failure cases.
"The people who wrote the code for the original MCAS system were obviously terribly far out of their league and did not know it. How can they implement a software fix, much less give us any comfort that the rest of the flight management software is reliable?"
This is the money quote.
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